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L - INTRODUCTION: 
Improvements in the efficient allocation of resources between the prívate and public 
sectors of an economy - as well as among its several public sub-sectors - can be reached insofar 
as both public revenue and expenditure have visibility, this is, the burden of public revenue and 
the benefit of public expenditure should be fully noticeable by individuáis1. 
Concerning public revenue, its visibility has changed in the course of history, depending 
on both economic (as the development level of a country) and political (as mechanisms of fiscal 
¡Ilusión used by politicians, bureaucrats, and interest groups to overeóme taxpayers' resistance) 
factors (Wagner, 1976; Borcherding, 1977; Buchanan and Wagner, 1977; Fiorina and Noli, 
1978; Pommerehne and Schneider, 1978; Brennan and Buchanan, 1980; Frey and Pommerehne, 
1982; Tullock, 1989; Tabellini and Alesina, 1990; Dunleavy, 1991; Mueller, 1993). In a similar 
way, the compliance with such required property by fiscal systems now in forcé might differ 
remarkably among countries. 
With regard to public expenditure, the final or intermedíate, the public or prívate 
nature, the spacial effeets or dimensions, the costs necessary to obtain consumption, and other 
inherent characteristics of pubiicly provided goods and services represent major factors 
determining their benefit visibility (Weingast, Shepsle, and Johnsen, 1981; Solano, 1983; 
Hamilton, 1983; Becker, 1983, 1985; Mueller and MureU, 1985, 1986; Wright, 1986; Mueller, 
1987; Wolff, 1987; Wildasin, 1990; Henrekson, 1992). 
In any case, it is necessary to dispose of logical and general indicators permitting to 
quantify, as exactly as possible, to what extent the required property of visibility is reached at 
every moment by local, state, federal or confederal, supranational, and general fiscal sub-
systems and systems of countries, since "...the systematic misperception of key fiscal parameters 
may significantly distort fiscal choices by the electorate"2. Although some authors (Puviani, 
1903; Buchanan, 1967) have analyzed several elements of the tax structure largely hidden so that 
voters do not perceive the entire cost of providing public goods, very few attempts have been 
performed till now to measure fiscal ¡Ilusión or fiscal visibility in a systematic, general and direct 
way. However, many contributions have tried to detect and measure different manifestations or 
types (debt ¡Ilusión, flypaper effect, income elasticity of the tax structure, complexity of the tax 
system, etc.) of this characteristic for empirical applications trying to expiain the absolute or 
relative sizes of public budget and biases in budgetary decisions. 
'By revenue visibility we mean visibility of direct burden of public revenue. Some 
types of public revenue (for instance, revenue from public property) might not involve 
any burden in the sense here reserved for this term. Symmetrically, by public 
expenditure visibility, visibility of direct benefit of public expenditure must be 
understood. Again, some types of public expenditure (for example, public purchases of 
prívate financial assets at market prices) might not carry any benefit with them. 
2(Oates, 1991, page 431). 
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Wagner (1976) undertook a Herfindahl índex as a proxy variable to capture the 
complexity of public revenue systems. But his approach suffered, as acknowledged by himself, 
from serious deficiencies, since the visibility of the several classes of public revenue is likely to 
vary greatly, and this characteristic is not captured by this index. For this reason, it is not 
surprising that subsequent econometric work based on the Herfindahl index has yielded confuse 
and contradictory results (see: Munley and Greene, 1978; Clotfelter, 1976; Pommerehne and 
Schneider, 1978; Baker, 1983; Breeden and Hunter, 1985). When measuring fiscal illusion or 
fiscal visibility, many factors, like the relative size and the internal structure of types of revenue 
and public expenditure, the institutional framework, etc., are to be taken into account. So, in 
spite of the crucial importance of the visibility variable, its measurement is not done till now in 
a systematic, general and direct way because of its underlying complexity. 
This contribution, referring to the several levéis of territorial public administrations of 
any country, presents: 
A) Indicators permitting to make, in an operative way, time and space fiscal visibility 
measurements and comparisons, in order to assess the quality of sub-systems and systems of 
public revenue and expenditure as instruments for efficientiy re-allocating economic resources. 
B) Systematic and direct estimates on fiscal visibility of sub-systems and systems of public 
revenue now in forcé in the member countries of twenty significant OECD countries, showing 
a) the low valúes of revenue visibility for all these countries and b) the high divergences now 
existing among them. 
Policy implications from these estimates seem straightforward for such OECD countries: 
allocation improvements could be obtained by implementing changes and reforms aiming a) to 
raise valúes of public revenue visibility and b) to make domestic fiscal sub-systems and systems 
converge to OECD countries recording the highest valúes. 
H . - INDEX OF BURDEN V I S I B I L I T Y / INVISIBELITY OF T O T A L PUBLIC R E V E N U E : 
In general, for every level, L , of territorial public administrations of an economy, a 
visibility / invisibility index of its total public revenue, V L T , can be defined in such a way that 
0 <, V j <, 1 
based on the following formula: 
r,T \^ T T 
VL =22 xn y>L 
where: 
a) n = number of types of public revenue for level L of territorial public administrations; 
b) Xgf = relative financia] weight of public revenue of type i for level L of territorial public 
administrations, with i = 1, 2, n; this is: 
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with GFaf = absolute quantity of pubiic revenue of type i for level L of territorial public 
administrations; 
c) y¡J = visibility or perceptibility (for the policy intended - or legal - revenue-provider) factor 
of burden of public revenue of type i , to which level L of territorial public administrations is 
entitled, with 
0 < y j < 1 
ffl.- BURDEN V I S I B I L I T Y / INVISIBILITY OF A SPECIFIC PUBLIC REVENUE: 
An objective estimation of ya.7 - factor of perceptibility of the direct burden by a policy 
intended - or legal - revenue-provider of a public revenue of type i for level L of territorial 
public administrations - can be defined according to the following criteria: 
T T T T T • T 
Ya. = V ¡ L Pa. m i Ra. la. 
where: 
a) V ¡ L T = voluntary (va,7 = 0) or coercive (v^f = 1) nature of public revenue of type í for its 
policy intended - or legal - revenue-provider (coerciveness parameter), with 
0 < v - J < 1 
b) p¡J = full (p¡LT = 0) or nuil (pa,7 = 1) proportionality of the amount of public revenue of 
type i - the burden of which is borne by a policy intended - or legal - revenue-provider - to the 
cost of effíciently producing the good or service specifically received by him in return for his 
burden (proportionality parameter), with 
0 < f t j < 1 
c) m¡LT = full (nía.7 = 1) or nuil (m^7 = 0) information to the policy intended - or legal -
revenue-provider on the concept of the direct burden he is bearing when providing public 
revenue of type i (concept-information parameter), with 
0 <> ma7 < 1 
d) qjL7 = full (q¡L7 = 1) or nuil (q¡L7 = 0) information to the policy intended - or legal - revenue-
provider on the amount of the direct burden he is bearing when providing public revenue of 
type i (amount-information parameter), with 
0 ^ q j <; 1 
e) ¡a,7 = intermedíate (¡a,7 = 0) or final (¡a.7 = 1) position of the policy intended - or legal -
revenue-provider in relation to his direct burden (burden-shifting parameter), with 
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I V . - INDEX OF B E N E F I T V I S I B I L I T Y / INVISEMLITY OF T O T A L P U B L I C 
EXPENDITURE: 
Similarly to the case of public revenue, for every level of territorial public 
administrations, L , an index of benefit visibility / invisibility of total public expenditure, V L E , 
can be defined in such a way that 
0 < V L E < 1 
based on the following formula: 
TrE E E V L =LxfL y/L 
M 
where: 
a) q = number of types of public expenditure performed by level L of territorial public 
administrations; 
b) X , L E = relative Financial weight of public expenditure of type f performed by level L of 
territorial public administrations, with f = 1, 2, q; this is: 
2£ 1 
with GFn.E = absolute quantity of public expenditure of type f performed by level L of 
territorial pubiic administrations; 
c) y„f = visibility or perceptibility (by the policy intended - or legal - consumer) factor of 
benefit of public expenditure of type f performed by level L of territorial public administrations, 
where 
0 ^ y j < 1 
V . - B E N E F I T V I S I B I L I T Y / INVISIBILITY OF A SPECIFIC PUBLIC EXPENDITURE: 
An objective estimation of y ^ (factor of perceptibility by a policy intended - or legal -
consumer of the direct benefit of a public expenditure of type f performed by level L of 
territorial public administrations) can be defined according to the following criteria: 
„ E „ E „ E _ E _ E¡ E 
where: 
a) V , L E = nuil (v„,E = 0) or full (vn,E = 1) consumption of a pubiicly supplied good of type f by 
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¡ts policy intended - or legal - user or beneficiary (consumption parameter), with 
0 á r j í 1 
b) p„,E * full (pn.E = O) or nuil (p„,E = 1) proportionality of cost of efficient production of the 
publicly supplied good of type f to a specifically requited monetary burden borne by the policy 
intended - or legal - user o beneficiary (proportionality parameter), with 
0 < p„.E < 1 
c) = full (tOfd = 1) or nuil (m^ = 0) information to the policy intended - or legal -
consumer or user on the concept of the direct benefit he is receiving when public expenditure 
of type f is being performed (concept-information parameter), with 
0 < < 1 
d) q1 L E = full (q,f- = 1) or nuil (q„.E = 0) information to the policy intended - or legal -
consumer or user on the amount of tbe direct benefit he is receiving when public expenditure 
of type f is performed (amount-information parameter), with 
0 :£ «fa* £ 1 
e) i„f = intermedíate ( i ^ * = 0) or final ( i ^ = 1) position of the policy intended - or legal - user 
or beneficiary of the publicly supplied good of type f in relation to his direct benefit (benefit-
shifting parameter), with 
o =s < ; i 
V L - E M P I R I C A L ESTIMATES ON BURDEN V I S I B I L I T Y OF T O T A L PUBLIC REVENUE: 
The following table presents weighted estimates on burden visibility of public revenue 
and grants of twenty significant OECD countries, obtained by applying index 
n 
V L = ¿2xn y a. 
defined in sections I I and D I of this paper, to fiscal systems and sub-systems now in forcé in 
these countries. Such valúes have been calcuiated mainly from information and primary data 
on public cash flows provided by both the Commission of the European Communities3, 
reflecting tax structures of - and institutional situation in - every member country on January 
1, 1992, and the International Monetary Fund4. For brevity reasons. intermediate working 
tables are here omitted. 
3Inventory of Taxes Levied in the Member States of the European Communities. 
15th edition, Commission of the European Communities, Luxembourg, 1993. 
4 A Manual on Government Finance Statistics. International Monetary Fund, 
Washington, 1986, and Government Finance Statistics Yearbook 1994. Volume XVIII , 
International Monetary Fund, Washington, 1994. 
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Three hypotheses on mínimum, plausible, and máximum shifting of tax burden have 
been assumed, giving rise to the corresponding series of máximum, V M , plausible, V p , and 
mínimum, V m , valúes of weighted-visibility estimates of revenue burden for the policy intended -
or legal - revenue-providers. 
Accordíng to the V M - máximum weighted - visibility estimates of public revenue and 
grants: 
A) Australia, with a valué of 21,36%, has the most visible central sub-system, Portugal having 
the least one, with 5,53%. 
B) Switzerland, with a valué of 18,98%, has the most visible intermedíate sub-system, and Spain 
the least one, with 1,15%. Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, and United Kingdom lacked state, 
región, or province government level for the years respectively considered. 
C) Sweden, with a valué of 48,92%, has the most visible local sub-system, Netherlands having 
the least one, with 0,40% only. Estimations for Greece were not possible because of non-
availability of primary data. 
D) Luxembourg, with a valué of 43,50%, has the most visible supranational sub-system, and 
Greece the least one, with 1,03%5. Estimates were not possible: 
a) For Italy because of non-availability of primary data. 
b) For Austria, Finland, and Sweden because these countries were not still members of tbe 
European Union for the years considered. 
E ) Sweden, with a valué of 33,36%, has the most visible general system, Portugal having the 
least one, with 6,29%. Estimates for Greece and Italy were not possible because of non-
availability of primary data. 
According to the V p - plausible weighted - visibility estimates: 
A) Again Australia, with a valué of 15,58%, has the most visible central sub-system, Portugal 
having the least one, with 3,88%. 
B) Switzerland, with a valué of 14,26%, has the most visible intermedíate sub-system, and Spain 
the least one, with 0,89% only. 
C) Sweden, with a valué of 30,58%, has the most visible local sub-system, Netherlands having 
the least one, with 0,23%. An estímate for Greece was not possible because of non-availability 
of primary data. 
D) Luxembourg, with a valué of 37,95%, has the most visible supranational sub-system, Greece 
having the least one, with 0,87%. Estimations were not possible: 
a) For Italy because of non-availability of primary data. 
b) For Austria, Finland, and Sweden because these countries were not still members of the 
European Union for the years considered. 
5Notice that Australia, Canadá, Norway, Switzerland and U.S.A. do not have 
supranational government level. 
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E) Sweden, with a valué of 20,22%, again has the most visible general system, Portugal having 
the least one, with 4,33%. Estimates for Greece and Italy were not possible because of non-
availability of primary data. 
According to the \ m - mínimum weighted - visibility estimates: 
A) Australia, with a valué of 9,81%, has the most visible central sub-system, Sweden having the 
least one, with 2,02%. 
B) Switzerland, with a valué of 9,53%, again has the most visible intermedíate sub-system, and 
Australia the least one, with 0,42% only. 
C) Sweden, with a valué of 12,23%, has the most visible local sub-system, Finland and United 
Kingdom having the least one, with practically 0,00%. An estímate for Greece was not possible 
because of non-availability of primary data. 
D) Luxembourg, with a valué of 32,40%, has the most visible supranational subsystem, Portugal 
having the least one, with practically 0,00%. Estimations were not possible: 
a) For Italy because of non-availability of primary data. 
b) For Austria, Finland, and Sweden because these countries were not members of the European 
Union for the years considered. 
E) Denmark, with a valué of 12,63%, has the most visible general fiscal system, and Portugal 
the least one, with 2,36%. Estimates for Greece and Italy were not possible because of non-
availability of primary data. 
V I L - CONCLUSIONS: 
The quality of public revenue and expenditure sub-systems and systems as policy 
instrumentó for efficiently allocating economic resources among prívate and public sectors and 
sub-sectors varíes in time and space as a result of economic, political, and social factors. 
The índices of fiscal visibility / invisibility defined in the previous sections of this paper 
bring forward a general measurement method which can be used to make relevant quantified 
comparisons among member countries of the International Monetary Fund provided that 
detailed statistic figures on execution of public budgetó as well as information about the structure 
of the different types of public administrations' revenue and expenditure programmes are 
available to researchers. 
Estimates obtained from different assumptions on tax shifting by applying these Índices 
to measure the burden visibility of revenue sub-systems and systems now in forcé in twenty 
significant OECD countries show: 
First.- Low plausible valúes of burden visibility for all these countries, specially for: 
a) Norway (4,39%), Greece (4,38%), Luxembourg (4,21%) and Portugal (3,88%) at a central 
level of government. 
b) Australia (1,74%) and Spain (0,89%) at an intermedíate (state, región or province) level of 
government. 
c) Italy (0,69%), United Kingdom (0,63%), Ireland (0,36%) and Netherlands (0,23%) at a local 
level of government. 
d) Portugal (1,67%) and Greece (0,87%) - among European Union member countries - at a 
supranational level of government. 
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e) Germany (6,86%), Austria (6,58%), Luxembourg (6,06%) and Portugal (4,33%) at the general 
government level. 
These low valúes of revenue visibility stem from the concurrence of several factors such 
as non-coerciveness, existence of specifíc requitals, lack of information on concepts and 
quantities, partial shifting of burden by tax-payers, intergovernmental grants, etc. 
Second.- Significant divergences between plausible valúes recorded by the three most visible 
general governments (Sweden, 20,22%; Denmark, 18,40%; Finland, 16,11%) and the three least 
ones (Austria, 6,58%; Luxembourg, 6,06%; and Portugal, 4,33%). 
Policy implications of these estimates seem straightforward for countries becoming 
economicaily more efficient and integrated: present revenue visibility valúes are low in general, 
and allocation improvements could be obtained by implementing changes and reforms a) to raise 
valúes of public revenue visibility and b) to make domestic fiscal sub-systems and systems 
converge to OECD countries recording the highest valúes. 
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PUBLIC R E V E N U E V I S I B I L I T Y 
COUNTRIES ATE ARS vM 
AUSTRALIA, 1992 
A) Consolidated central government 21,36% 15.58% 9,81% 
3,06% 1,74% 0,42% 
18,85% 14,14% 9,43% 
- - -
18,43% 13,11% 7,78% 
AUSTRIA, 1992 
7,52% 5,18% 2,83% 
6,30% 5,03% 3,76% 
7,11% 5,61% 4,11% 
- - -
9,05% 6,58% 4,12% 
B E L G I U M , 1992 
12,06% 8,25% 4,45% 
B) State, región or province government - - -
6,14% 4,44% 2,75% 
17,22% 14,53% 11,84% 
13,11% 9,10% 5,09% 
CANADA, 1991 
17,74% 13,14% 8,54% 
10,48% 8,20% 5,93% 
9,95% 7,40% 4,85% 
- - -
18,03% 13,62% 9,21% 
DENMARK, 1993 
11,38% 8,93% 6,47% 
- - -
17,17% 12,88% 8,58% 
12,91% 10,03% 7,15% 
24,16% 18,40% 12,63% 
FINLAND, 1990 
A) Consolidated central government 14,76% 11,66% 8,55% 
- - -
21,07% 10,54% 0,00% 
-
26,06% 7 s~ 7 7 frr 
16,11% 
6,16% 
FRANCE, 1992 
10,09% 6,44% 2,79% 
17,52% 13,14% 8,76% 
31,27% 27,27% 23,27% 
14,77% 10,18% 5,59% 
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G E R M A J N Y , 1 9 9 2 
0,44 JO 7,4-4 /o 7 74% 4,4-4 /o 
DA Cf i-»t,\ iio/TÍnn A r nrru'inco f i n u ü r n m o n l 8 7 7 % 
Oj t i ¡o 
6 5 3 % 4 78% *i»*.o /O 
1 01% 1U /C 1 70% 
T i A C i i n r n n n l i o n < i l nn i / ommont 3 0 4 3 % 2 6 0 1 % 2 1 6 0 % 
i i l j Vil/ /O 
dpnprnl QnVPTUTYLPYlt . . . . . . . . 9 , 9 7 % 6 , 8 6 % 3,80% 
ijKJbJLuJc/, i y y j 
\ A f ^ A n r A l í / í n l a / í Aüntfi 1 rtn\' orn m ont 5 6 0 % 4 3 8 % 7 1 7 % 
4 , 1 / /O 
T ) \ C"*,j • ¿a r o n i A n nr n r n v i npo ' invpm m <»? 1 1 
I * A T a a o I fiAirommont 
T Y \ Cnnro n' 1 1 í A n O 1 01/11/07*11 I T I í»nt 1 0 3 % 0 8 7 % 0 7 0 % 
TT>T7T A M D I O O I 
A A UAnrAlí/íntor) nant f i l fTAi/or*r> m o n t- 1 1 8 6 % 8 9 4 % 6 0 2 % 
D A Cénta i>Artí An Ar nrAirmPO ílAUOmm únt 
U j H O / O U ^ J U / c 0 2 4 % 
U,4-4 JO 
TTA C n n f'i n ' i f i n n Q i o n v p r n m p n t 2 6 , 1 7 % 2 2 , 7 6 % 1 9 , 3 4 % 
CvPTtprriL Qnvprnmpnt . . . . . . . . 7 3 , 7 3 % 9,98% 6,83% 
T T 1 A T V 1 Q(V* 
11 A L , x, í y y j 
A A í~* r\nn-x\! j-í n F /"T control flAVAntlH m é 1 0 7 9 % 7 5 0 % 4 2 1 % 
TIA Ctota raniAn n i * nrAVinPA ( J í i v o m m p n t 
l ^ i T a / I < I I (lAvommont 0 , 9 2 % 0 , 6 9 % 0 4 6 % 
TAA Cnwi'rtwftétAMA 1 AAirommont 
CrPttpTftl QfiVPTTlTIlPnt 
T T T V T A T D A T T D r ' I O O I 
L U A Í S Í V L D U I J K V J , í y y i 
A A C~* A n r A l í i\ r% + /MMitrol ímuf lmmont 6 0 5 % 4 2 1 % 7 ^ 8 % 
0 76% 
Y, 10 JO 
7 77 Oí. 1 , 4 6 J O /t OCC7L 
4 7 5 0 % 
-t4,4U JO 
3 7 0 5 % 
4 / ,-*4 /O 
^7 40% 
C*pnprnl onvpTTiTnpnt 8,32% 6 , 0 6 % 3 , 7 9 % 
M C ' T I T C D T A V T T \ C I O O I 
iNh, 1 jnJbK-LAÍNJL/b, í y y o 
1 7 1 4 % 0 0 4 % 
, / , U * 4 JO 
5 0 5 % 
4,^4 /O 
U A w A-. 4- r\ .AAi Í-» rt /-\ T— nrATAnAn AAiiorntYi o n í 
n 4nc£, 0 7 3 % A 06% U , u O JO 
T i A W • • AWinAllAflA 1 rtAiTnimiw O H F 1 6 4 3 % 1 3 7 5 % 
U j . J JO 
1 0 0 6 % 
l v , U O JO 
f~^onPrn/ ofivprnmpnt 11,54% 8,56% 5,58% 
XT/~YD \ X 7 A "V t non 
I N U K W A Y , íyyu 
A A /" 1 ATA c /^ i 11 íl n t A/4 /tnntro 1 AAIÍOrA m OH ^  6 3 3 % u,44 /o 4 3 0 % 2 4 6 % 
Di OJ-rt + rnrtion o** nv*Hirinoo o^nrov*nm ant 
1 7 7 0 % 
i J ,¿y JO 
1 7 0 6 % x¿,yo JO 8 6 4 % 
0 , 0 * 4 JO 
15,30% 11,18% 7,06% 
PORTUGAL, 1 9 8 9 
5 , 5 3 % 3 , 8 8 % 2 , 2 4 % 
4 , 0 6 % 2 , 2 6 % 0 , 4 6 % 
3 , 3 4 % 1 , 6 7 % 0 , 0 0 % 
6,29% 4,33% 2,36% 
1 3 
o r A J L Í N , xyy x 
Al (""nn^ AÜHsitpd cpnfral oovprnmpnt 11,83% 7,51% 3,18% 
Hl Stnfp rpoínn or nrovínrp í/ovpmmpnt 1,15% 0,89% 0,64% 
OI T.ocal povernment 5,84% 3,51% 1,17% 
11,01% 9,41% 7,81% 
11,95% 7,74% 3,53% 
SWEDEN 1992 
W OonsniiHíitpH cpnfral <*ovemmpnt 15,66% 8,84% 2,02% 
48,92% 30,58% 12,23% 
33,36% 20,22% 7,07% 
SWITZERLAND 1984 
7,58% 5,01% 2,43% 
B) State región or province govenunent 18,98% 14,26% 9,53% 
23,43% 17,57% 11,71% 
D) Supranational government 
20,04% 14,65% 9,26% 
TINTTFD KINGDOM 1992 
A J I 1 1 X 11/1/ l Y l i " V J l / V J I ' l i 1 y y ~* Al Oonsnlidaíed central poverament 9,58% 7,19% 4,79% 
B) State, región or province government 
OI T.neal ffovernmpnt 1,26% 0,63% 0,00% 
D) Supranational government 29,92% 26,16% 22,39% 
11,14% 7,99% 4,85% 
UNITED STATES, 1992 
14,15% 9,98% 5,82% 
10,05% 8,31% 6,58% 
10,46% 7,91% 5,35% 
16,76% 12,49% 8,21% 
Notes: 
V M = máximum weighted-visibility estimates of revenue burden for the legal revenue provider. 
V p = plausible weighted-visibility estimates of revenue burden for the legal revenue provider. 
V m = mínimum weighted-visibility estimates of revenue burden for the legal revenue provider. 
- == non-existing government level for the year considered. 
... = datum iacking for the year considered. 
Source: own eiaboration from data in Government Finance Statistics Yearbook 1994, volume 
X V i n , International Monetary Fund, Washington, 1994. 
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